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SHIFI SEEN IN COURT'S RELIGION STAND:
IN THREE KEY RULINGS, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
HAS MOVED TO A NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH TO CHURCH-STATE CONFLICTS.
By DAVID G. SAVAGE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
June 20, 1993
In three key rulings on religion this month, the
U.S. Supreme Court has opted for a new approach
toward church-state conflicts: The government may
not discriminate against religion.
While that hardly seems like a startling
development, it does mark a subtle shift in the law
that could have a profound impact on schools,
colleges and lawmakers.
Under the non-discriminatory approach, thejustices
are likely to uphold state-sponsored vouchers for
children enrolled in parochial schools, child-care
programs that operate through churches and school
ceremonies in which students invoke God.
University of Chicago law professor Michael
McConnell on Saturday called the recent decisions "a
welcome corrective" to past rulings that demanded a
rigid separation of church and state.
"Neutrality toward religion seems to be the theme
this year," said McConnell, whose writings on the
history of the Constitution's religion clauses are often
cited by the high court. "These three cases all had to
do with discrimination against religion, and the result
was the same: The government may not discriminate
in this way."
Religious-rights advocates have long complained
that the court's insistence on a strict separation of
church and state has resulted in discrimination against
religion.
In 1989, a sympathetic Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, joined by three fellow conservatives,
accused his more liberal colleagues of displaying "an
unjustified hostility to religion" by insisting that all
religious symbols be removed from public property
and that any religious message be removed from the
public schools.
Certainly the government may not fund or promote
religion, Kennedy said, but neither should its courts
"send a clear message of disapproval."
This term, the conservatives' stance of government
"neutrality" toward religion seems to have taken
hold.
On June 7, the justices unanimously rejected a
New York school board's policy that permitted civil
and social groups to use its facilities but denied the
same privileges to Christian groups that wanted to
present lectures and a film stressing "traditional
family values."
A federal judge and a U.S. appeals court in New
York had upheld this policy, but the high court
disagreed. It is unconstitutional, wrote Justice Byron
R. White, because it "discriminates" against the
church speakers "solely because (they) dealt with the
subject from a religious viewpoint."
On June 11, the court struck down a Florida city's
law that made "ritual animal sacrifice" a crime.
Again, a federal judge and a U.S. appeals court in
Atlanta had upheld the laws over the objections of the
Santeria church, whose members practice animal
sacrifice.
Writing for the court, Kennedy said the key
question was whether the law "discriminates against
religious beliefs . . . or prohibits conduct because it
is undertaken for religious reasons."
He noted that the City Council in Hialeah, Fla.,
passed its new laws against "animal cruelty" only
after residents complained about an influx of blacks
from Caribbean islands who practiced the Santeria
faith. The Constitution, he said, "protects against
government hostility which is masked, as well as
overt," he wrote.
And Friday, the court ruled that tax money may be
used to pay for a deaf child's sign-language
interpreter in a Roman Catholic school, the first time
the justices have specifically upheld the use of public
employees in a religious school.
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist stressed that "religious institutions are
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(not) disabled" from participating in government-aid
programs simply because they are church-related.
In this instance, a federal judge in Tucson and a
U.S. appeals court in San Francisco had ruled that
the deaf student could have a tax-supported
interpreter with him in a public high school but not in
Catholic high school. To do so, according to the
lower courts, would create a "symbolic union"
between church and state.
Disagreeing, Rehnquist said it "does not offend"
the Constitution "when the government offers a
neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school."
By this standard, religious schools do not get a
special subsidy, but nor do their students suffer a
special disadvantage because they choose a parochial
school.
Earlier this month, the justices also let stand a
U.S. appeals court ruling from Texas that permitted
high school students to offer a nonsectarian prayer
during their graduation ceremony. The appellate
judges said that while school officials may not
advocate prayer, students acting on their own may do
so.
These decisions are based on the First Amendment,
which says government "shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."
For the past 50 years, the justices have struggled
to apply this command in the many instances where
church and state intersect, attempting to permit the
practice of religion without promoting it.
In 1947, the court officially adopted the view once
voiced by Thomas Jefferson. The First Amendment
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
church and state," the justices said. In the 1960s, the
court relied on this standard to outlaw prayers and
Bible reading in the public schools.
Subsequent decisions went further to outlaw even
a "symbolic linking" of church and state.
In 1985, for example, Justice William J. Brennan
Jr., the court's leading liberal, wrote an opinion for
a 5-4 majority that struck down the common practice
of sending of public school tutors into low-income,
parochial schools.
A federal aid-to-education law required schools to
provide extra tutoring for poor children wherever
they were enrolled, but Brennan said that sending
public teachers into a Catholic school created "an
excessive entanglement" between church and state.
Since then, the high court has gradually retreated
from the strict separation view. In recent years,
Rehnquist has won a shaky majority for the view that
"neutrality" toward religion is the better policy.
While none of this term's rulings mark dramatic
departures, even advocates of strict separation say the
court's position has evolved.
"Neutrality and discrimination are now the driving
principles for the First Amendment. That's what
seems to motivate the justices," said Steven R.
Shapiro of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Still, Rehnquist's majority has been narrow at
times, and it could evaporate with White's retirement.
The group Americans United for Separation of
Church and State denounced the ruling in behalf of
the deaf child as "forcing taxpayers to foot the bill
for religious indoctrination." Its officials voiced high
hopes for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, newly nominated to
be a justice.
"The whole equation could change with White's
departure," said Joseph Conn of Americans United.
"We think she will take a separationist view," he
added.
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IN SEARCH OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
BY DAVID COLE
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
The Framers probably thought they were being
crystal clear in drafting the First Amendment's
religion clauses: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." What could be simpler?
Government may neither advance nor inhibit the
exercise of religion, and therefore need only remain
neutral to abide by the religion clauses' dictates.
But as the Supreme Court's religion cases this term
demonstrate, nothing is simple about defining
neutrality. In the space of two weeks, the Court
handed down three religion decisions, generating 10
separate opinions. One opinion - Justice Anthony
Kennedy's in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) - was itself
divided into four separate sections joined by four
different groupings of justices.
The Court's establishment and free-exercise
doctrines both appear to be in a precarious state: The
existing rules prevail only by the narrowest of
threads, but there is no consensus on how to replace
them. In two establishment-clause cases this term,
the Court sent mixed signals, once applying the
traditional test articulated in Lemon v. Kurizman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), and once not even mentioning the
test at all. Six of the justices have disparaged the
Lemon test in previous opinions, but they have not
yet forged a majority to bury it.
And in the Court's one free-exercise case. City of
Hialeah, Justice David Souter wrote an eloquent
concurrence urging the Court to reconsider the test
that now guides that jurisprudence, making a strong
case that the doctrine is internally inconsistent and
insufficiently protective of religious freedom. With
Justice Byron White about to be replaced by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who is far more attentive to
free-exercise concerns, the court may well take up
Souter's invitation in the near future.
Neutral Clashes
The problem with settling on a doctrinal approach
to either religion clause is that, as Souter succinctly
put it in City of Hialeah, while both religion clauses
demand official neutrality toward religion, "neutrality
is not self-revealing." For one thing, as the state
takes a more expensive role in affirmatively
providing for its citizens' needs, the neutrality called
for by the establishment clause appears to conflict
with the neutrality required by the free-exercise
clause. If the state broadly provides subsidized
education to its citizens, for example, does the
free-exercise clause require the state "neutrally" to
subsidize the education of those citizens - whose
religious scruples direct them to choose a sectarian
school, or does the establishment clause require the
state to maintain "neutrality" by denying assistance to
such students?
Two of the Court's religion cases addressed the
seemingly intractable problem of state aid to religious
institutions. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993),
the Court held unanimously that a public school that
makes its property available after hours for a wide
range of social and recreational uses may not bar a
group from using the property for religious ends.
But the Lamb's Chapel decision was more
surprising for what it did not do than for what it did.
In result, Lamb's Chapel reflects only a minor
extension of the Court's decision 12 years ago
requiring a state university to provide a religious
student ground the same access to university property
as it provided other student groups. What the Court
did not do was overrule the Lemon test, which
requires careful examination of a challenged statute's
purpose, effect, and operation to determine whether
it constitutes an establishment of religion.
The majority's failure to overrule Lemon sparked
a lurid concurrence from Justice Antonin Scalia, who
likened the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried." He opined that the only reason Lemon has
survived is that it is so subjective and manipulable
that it can be invoked or ignored at will.
Scalia urged the Court to adopt a test that would
merely forbid government from "[magnifying] state
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or local embrace of a particular religious sect." The
difference between Scalia's proposed rule and the
Lemon test could not be more stark. Where Lemon
scrutinizes the substantive effects of a challenged
program. Scalia's test would require only formal
neutrality among religious sects. In Lamb's Chapel,
however, Scalia could convince only Justice Clarence
Thomas to sign on to such a formalistic view.
But if Lamb's Chapel appears to reaffirm Lemon,
the Court's other establishment-clause decision,
issued only 11 days later, once again calls Lemon
into question. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District, 61 U.S.L.W. 4641 (1993), a divided Court
held, without citing Lemon, that providing a
government-employed sign-language interpreter to a
student attending a Catholic school did not violate the
establishment clause.
Zobrest illustrates the difficulty of defining
neutrality under any test. If one looked closely at the
government interpreter's function, the provision of an
interpreter appeared to endorse specific religious
messages. It was undisputed that the interpreter
accompanied James Zobrest to Catholic mass and
religion classes, and regularly transmitted Catholic
prayer and messages.
Yet viewed from another perspective, the provision
of the interpreter could be seen as neutral. The
majority stressed that the interpreter was part of a
general federal program that assisted all
schoolchildren with disabilities, wherever they chose
to attend school. The federal progiam was neutral as
between religious and secular schools, and the
assistance took place in a religious setting in this
instance only because of the independent choice of
Zobrest and his parents.
In dissent, Justices Harry Blackmun and Souter
maintained that neutrality at the level of generality is
insufficient to avoid establishment dangers. They
pointed out that the Court has invalidated programs
providing remedial teachers, slide projectors, tape
recorders, and record players on an equal basis to
religious and secular schools. Such formally neutral
treatment, the Court has declared, would
impermissibly entangle the state with religion and
might appear to endorse religious messages.
Similarly, in Zobrest, Blackmun and Souter argued,
the government crossed the line into establishment of
religion when it "[furnished] the medium for
communication of a religious message."
Lines Formally Drawn
Blackmun and Souter's analysis insists that
mandating formal neutrality is not enough to forestall
establishment of religion. But once one moves
beyond a formal-neutrality requirement, it becomes
very difficult to know where to draw the line.
Indeed, the line that Blackmun and Souter drew in
Zobrest - government may not "furnish the medium
for communication of a religious message" - is
difficult to square with their votes in Lamb's Chapel,
which required a public school to allow its property
to be used as the medium for communication of a
religious message.
Taken together, Lamb's Chapel and Zobrest
confirm Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Lemon test:
It is ignored as often as it is applied, and even when
applied, it leads to inconsistent results. Yet Scalia's
alternative test would gain predictability and ease of
application at the cost of ignoring the substantive
dangers posed by even formally neutral government
support of religion, such as endorsement of religious
messages and entanglement with religious institutions.
In free-exercise jurisprudence, Justice Scalia's
formal-neutrality approach has prevailed, at least for
the time being. In Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), Scalia garnered five votes for
the proposition that neutral laws of general
application raise no free-exercise issues, even if they
disparately burden religious groups. The decision
sparked a firestorm of criticism from all religious
quarters and has led to efforts to enact a federal
statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that
would, in effect, resurrect the standard that preceded
Smith, though on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds.
Justice Scalia's free-exercise rule, like his proposed
establishment-clause test, is alluringly simple. The
Court need only ask whether a law targets a
particular religious practice or group. But this term's
free-exercise case. City of Hialeah, suggests that the
Smith rule is not so simple to apply and may be on
shaky ground. Those justices who agreed that the
Smith rule should govern disagreed as to how it
should be applied, and three justices -- Souter,
Blackmun, and Sandra Day O'Connor - suggested
that Smith should be reconsidered.
The City of Hialeah case presented a rare example
of legislation specifically directed at suppressing a
particular religious practice. When the Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye announced plans to build a house
of worship in Hialeah, Fla., the town responded by
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enacting a series of laws designed to outlaw the
church's ritual of animal sacrifice.
As Justice Kennedy put it, the laws Hialeah
enacted were nothing more than religious
gerrymandering: They carefully preserved the
prerogative of hunters to kill animals for sport, of
rabbis to slaughter animals for kosher preparation,
and of all citizens to kill animals for extermination or
humanitarian purposes.
Given the facts, the Court's unanimous result is
hardly surprising. The surprise came from Justice
Souter, who maintained in a separate opinion that the
Smith test ignores the fact that formally neural laws
may have substantive effects that are decidedly
non-neural.
Thus, for example, the prohibition on peyote use
at issue in Smith disparately burdened religious
groups who use peyote as an integral part of their
worship, just as a general prohibition on alcohol
consumption would disproportionately burden those
whose religious rituals incorporate sacramental wine.
To achieve substantive, as opposed to formal,
neutrality in such a situation, specific accommodation
of particular religious practices may be necessary.
(Indeed, Prohibition exempted sacramental uses of
wine, and nobody suggested that this accommodation
was a non-neutral establishment of religion.)
Souter's concurrence poses the issue underlying
both religion clauses as sharply as it has ever been
posed: Does the Constitution demand only formal
neutrality, or does it impose an obligation on the
Court to ensure that some measure of substantive
neutrality is achieved, even if that requires treating
religious minorities differently? At this state, the
Court's answers are in some tension with each other:
On the establishment side, Lemon demands
substantive neutrality, but on the free-exercise side,
Smith requires only formal neutrality. As one might
expect where such tension exists, neither doctrine
seems especially stable.
Judging Results
The debate about formal and substantive neutrality
is by no means limited to the religion context and
closely parallels a similar debate in equal-protection
jurisprudence. In both settings, a formal understand
of the constitutional right appears easier to implement
than a substantive understanding, but may neglect the
breadth of the problem.
The only area in which the Supreme Court has
interpreted the equal-protection clause to guarantee
substantive, as opposed to formal, equality is school
desegregation: Segregation is formally equal, but its
substantive effects are not. As four decades of
desegregation litigation have demonstrated,
substantive equality is difficult to define and even
more difficult to achieve. The Court has avoided
such difficulties in other equal-protection contexts by
guaranteeing only formal equality, but at a cost: Our
society has not come close to achieving any measure
of actual equality for racial minorities.
In the equal-protection debate, conservatives often
adopt the formal-equality position. But in the
religion context, many classically conservative voices
acknowledge formal equality's shortcomings. In City
of Hi.aleah, an array of
mainstream-religious-organization amici advanced the
same argument that civil-rights advocates have long
leveled at equal-protection doctrine: namely, that
merely requiring laws to be formally neutral fails to
address the concern that minorities (religious or
racial) are more likely to be harmed by the majority's
failure to consider a law's effects on minorities than
by openly prejudiced acts. Justice Souter's
concurrence gives eloquent voice to those concerns.
While Souter's City of Hialeah opinion is
addressed specifically to free-exercise jurisprudence,
and Scalia's Lamb's Chapel opinion addresses only
establishment-clause doctrine, their implications
extend much further, as the civil-rights parallels
suggest. The debate across these cases between
Scalia and Souter involves nothing less than
competing visions of justice.
Scalia advocates a limited view of neutrality (or
equality) in the interest of stating a rule capable of
consistent application, and rails against the
inconsistencies inherent in attempting to craft
substantive justice. Souter offers a broader vision,
one that acknowledges the reality of a society in
which minorities of all kinds are subject not only to
the tyranny but also to the indifference of the
majority. If the Court is going to protect the rights
of minorities (religious or otherwise) and individuals,
the hard choices demanded by a vision of substantive
justice cannot be avoided simply because they are
difficult; that is what judging is all about.
The concept of neutrality is central not only to the
religion and equal-protection clauses, but to the role
of adjudication itself. How the Court resolves the
tension between formal and substantive neutrality in
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enforcing the religion clauses may, therefore, say as
much about the Court's self-definition as it does
about the freedom of religion.
David Cole is an associated professor at
Georgetown University Law Center, where he
teaches constitutional law, and a volunteer staff
attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights in
New York City. A regular contributor to Legal
Times; Cole litigates cases involving First
Amendment rights, women's right, and international
human rights.
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CENTER USES FREE SPEECH TO DEFEND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
By Nancy E. Roman; THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Washington Times
July 18, 1993, Sunday, Final Edition
VIRGINIA BEACH - Debate is hard and fast as
Jay Sekulow and Bob Peck square off on whether
student-initiated and -led prayers violate the
Constitution.
"Is it totally unimaginable to you, Jay,* Michael
Kinsley was asking on CNN's "Crossfire," "that a
nonbeliever or a believer in a minority religion would
feel really uncomfortable and unhappy at ...
"Offended?" Mr. Sekulow asked.
"Not offended," Mr. Kinsley said quickly.
"Would really be made to feel like an outsider and
unwanted at an official graduation ceremony at a
public high school where there was a prayer?"
Mr. Sekulow, chief counsel of the American
Center for Law and Justice, replied: "An 18-year-old
at a graduation, or a 17-year-old, in America better
get used to speech they disagree with or feel
uncomfortable with. This is a free society."
"It is not the offense of the speech," said Mr.
Peck, attorney for the American Civil Liberties
Union. "It is the fact that government said this is an
event you are going to have to attend and you are
going to have to sit through."
Mr. Sekulow loved that line.
"Oh, you are going to have to sit through this
30-second prayer that you find repugnant. Well,
tough. This is America," he says, smiling. "This is
what I love: I'm sitting next to Bob Peck from the
ACLU, whom I respect, who's saying, 'Let's censor
speech.' "
Mr. Sekulow is chief litigator for the ACLJ, a
legal group founded by religious broadcaster Pat
Robertson to fight the erosion of religious freedom in
America. The group has posted one victory after
another, including such high-profile cases as:
* A 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling
allowing student-initiated and -led prayers at high
school graduations.
* A Supreme Court ruling that schools opening
their facilities to social and civic groups after hours
may not exclude church groups.
* A Supreme Court ruling that an
anti-discrimination law may not be used to sue
abortion clinic blockaders in federal court.
This weekend 300 lawyers from across the
country gathered at ACLJ headquarters in Virginia
Beach to learn how Mr. Sekulow and his colleagues
choose cases, map strategies and bring home victories
for what they believe to be religious freedom.
"The challenges of the future will occur in our
communities as well as our courtrooms," Mr.
Sekulow told them. "We need to equip attorneys and
clients with the information they need to understand
and protect their rights.
"Whether it's protecting student-initiated prayer or
defending the rights of pro-life demonstrators, we
have an incredible opportunity through the use of
creative strategies to build on successes of the past."
Mr. Sekulow compared the position of religious
rights activists to that of civil rights activists in the
1950s after the Supreme Court ruled that segregated
schools were unconstitutional.
"For a while school boards did nothing, and
schools were still segregated," he said. "We don't
want that to happen."
The ACLJ began in 1990 with a single lawyer,
Executive Director Keith Fournier, and grew into an
organization with an annual budget of nearly $6
million and a staff of 14 lawyers.
"We walked right into a void," Mr. Fournier
said. "It took us about 30 or 40 years to get into this
mess we're in now, and now we are going to have to
spend some time getting out of it."
"The mess," Mr. Fournier said, is a society in
which hate speech is protected and religious speech
is not; in which the government bans a rabbi from
praying at a high school graduation but funds an artist
who plunges a statuette of Jesus into a jar of urine; in
which a woman's right to abort her pregnancy is
233
defended as "reproductive choice" and Operation
Rescue is ostracized.
"The neo-Nazi club can meet after school, but a
Bible club cannot," Mr. Sekulow said. "Secularism
now reigns in America. It has replaced the
Judeo-Christian ethic as the moral base for society."
To reverse this trend, the ACU's team of lawyers
defended:
* An Idaho school district that allows
student-initiated prayer at graduations.
*A Wisconsin student whose school threatened to
censor his salutatorian speech if it contained prayer.
* Pro-life printers who refused to make
membership cards for the pro-choice group Vermont
Catholics for Free Choice.
* A pro-life pastor indicted on a felony count after
distributing literature critical of ajudge in front of the
judge's house.
* A group charged with trespassing after
evangelizing outside the public high school in Globe,
Ariz.
"Without God there are no values. It's a simple
point," said Thomas P. Monaghan, ACLJ's senior
counsel.
In the past year, the ACLJ, whose acronym is
intentionally similar to its top rival, the ACLU, took
two cases to the Supreme Court and won both.
In Bray vs. Alexandria Women's Clinic, Mr.
Sekulow argued for Operation Rescue, a group of
pro-life activists who blockade entrances to
abortion clinics, that a federal law cannot be used to
halt the protests.
The court ruled 5-4 that an 1871 anti-Ku Klux
Klan law may not be invoked against abortion
protesters because the law was intended to fight
class-based hatred, and abortion blockaders do not
discriminate against women as a class.
Later in the Supreme Court term, Mr. Sekulow
argued in a case called Lamb's Chapel that schools
should not be allowed to exclude religious groups if
facilities have been opened for general after-school
use.
"The way I understand it is, the communists are
in, the atheists are in, the agnostics are in, but
religion is out," Mr. Sekulow told the justices in
February.
Four months later, the justices gave the ACLJ a
9-0 victory, saying, "The First Amendment forbids
the government to regulate speech in ways that favor
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."
Now people are paying attention to the ACLJ.
"They are having an enormous impact," said Tom
Jipping, vice president of the Free Congress
Foundation. "By winning cases in the Supreme
Court, they send a message. . . . Just like the
ACLU has been able to discourage religious practice
through the threat of litigation, the ACU has been
able to encourage religious practice by winning."
Even the ACL's critics acknowledge its
effectiveness.
"They've won some high-visibility stuff," the
ACLU's Mr. Peck said. "They've been successful in
part because they are careful in choosing their cases.
"They have a good advocate in Jay [Sekulow]
because he is able to attract high-visibility cases, he's
well focused, which has not been common to these
kinds of efforts, and because he thinks about
long-term strategy. He does build on cases."
The problem with the ACLJ, ACLU spokesman
Phil Gutis said, is its moral agenda.
"The ACLJ is one that seeks to impose a certain
moral standard and viewpoint on the entire nation,"
he said. "Any child in elementary school civics class
learns that that's not what this country's about."
Mr. Sekulow said he is not interested in forcing
the ACU's pro-God, pro-family, pro-life agenda on
anyone. But he wants to make sure that those views
are not suppressed.
Asked if he would have taken the Lamb's Chapel
case if the plaintiffs had been Hindus, Mr. Sekulow,
who was born a Jew and converted to Christianity,
noted that he represented Hare Krishnas in a case that
asked whether a New York airport could bar them
from distributing literature.
"I'm not concerned about competing worldviews,"
he said. "The danger is in keeping any of them out
of the forum."
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Mr. Sekulow said his goal is to ensure that
religious speech, like any speech, has access to the
marketplace of ideas.
And the Supreme Court has been sympathetic.
"They can't change the rules because it happens to
be religion," Mr. Sekulow said. "Whether you agree
or don't agree with it, you don't want to see religion
treated as a second-class citizen."
That's his strategy: to frame cases in terms of free
speech. Lamb's Chapel was not about separation of
church and state, but about whether a church group
enjoys the same free-speech rights as the Boy Scouts
or the Kiwanis Club.
The Bray case wasn't about the 120-year-old
KKK act, but about the abortion blockaders' right
to speak against an action they find reprehensible.
"We argued the cases because we saw an attempt
to squelch First Amendment freedom of speech," he
said.
Mr. Sekulow said he does not agree with the
tenets of the Krishna offshoot from Hinduism. "But
we believe in freedom of speech. It's an absolute.
I don't like the Krishna literature, but I'll defend
handing it out. I'll defend NOW's right to hand out
their pro-choice literature, but they won't defend
mine."
Barry Lynn, executive director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, doesn't
buy the ACLJ's free-speech approach.
"The problem with his free-speech argument is
that it is largely bogus," Mr. Lynn said. "Under
certain circumstances religious speech must be treated
differently from other speech. The Constitution
distinguishes between religion and other activities."
The First Amendment says the government "shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"
a clause that has been understood to require a
separation of church and state. The amendment also
guarantees the free exercise of religion. Balancing
the religion clauses has long been a source of
contention in the courts.
The ACLJ says the establishment clause was
intended to prevent the government from choosing an
official religion but does not encroach on broad
religious liberty. The group says an overly broad
reading of the clause has led to an unfortunate lack of
protection for religious speech, while anti-war,
anti-God and anti-government speech are guarded.
"The establishment clause was not aimed at
individual private speech," Mr. Sekulow said.
The battle will continue next year, when Mr.
Sekulow takes another abortion case to the Supreme
Court.
He will argue that federal racketeering laws may
not be used to sue abortion clinic blockaders in
federal court.
Again, he will use a free-speech argument. He
said the case's implications for speech are broad,
affecting even church pastors who call on their
congregations to picket abortion clinics.
He is delighted at the dilemma the case presents
to civil libertarians inclined to be pro-choice but
nervous about the liberal application of racketeering
laws. "Their ox could get gored with this thing," he
said.
In defending the free-speech approach to the case,
Mr. Monaghan, ACLJ's senior counsel, notes that
the high court has been eager to uphold the right to
free speech, even when that speech is unpalatable.
But Mr. Lynn again criticized the free-speech
argument. "It ignores the fact that free speech is
limited not only by the establishment clause, but by
other legal principles," such as libel and obscenity.
"The thing the American Center for Law and
Justice doesn't understand is that for mainstream
religious groups in this country, there is a dizzying
level of freedom," he said. "Contrast what we have
with communist China, and you will understand
religious oppression."
Mr. Sekulow said: "It is naive to say that we are
not as bad as communist China, therefore everything
is OK. I don't buy that. The American people don't
buy that."
* Mr. Gutis, the ALCU spokesman, said he is glad
to have the ACU in the debate. "We welcome them
to the public forum. But we feel very strongly that
our point of view, outlined in the Bill of Rights, will
prevail."
ACU lawyers seem uncertain about their
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relationship to the American Civil Liberties Union.
Are they or aren't they archrivals?
Mr. Sekulow said part of his vision as chief
counsel to the ACL was to provide "some answer to
the ACLU."
Mr. Robertson, sometimes with Mr. Sekulow at
his side, regularly takes shots at the ACLU on his
Christian Broadcasting Network. But Mr. Sekulow
is quick to say they sometimes are on the same side.
For example, the ACLU supported the ACLJ on
the use of school facilities after hours. Mr. Gutis
said, "When they think they can get us on their side,
they eagerly seek our support."
"Absolutely," Mr. Sekulow said. "They're not
always wrong. I've enjoyed their support on a
number of cases, but when we disagree, we disagree
broadly, and what's different is that now there is
someone to answer them.
"They're not used to that."
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SUPREME COURT ISSUES STAY IN CHURCH-STATE DISPUTE
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The Supreme Court said Monday that a public
school district - created only to accommodate a
religious community - can continue to exist for the
present.
The case could turn out to be the latest challenge
of the so-called " Lemon test," the Supreme
Court's current yardstick for deciding whether
government is becoming excessively "entangled"
with religion.
That yardstick is increasingly coming under attack
from conservative justices led by Justice Antonin
Scalia.
Monday, the high court issued a stay of a lower
court ruling that undercut state-funding for the
handicapped in the district.
But the Supreme Court's order says the stay is
only in effect until the district files a formal appeal to
the Supreme Court. Then the high court must decide
whether or not to accept that appeal of the state court
ruling.
The New York Court of Appeals had declared
unconstitutional a state law that created the Kiryas
Joel Village School District.
The main effect of that lower court ruling was that
200 handicapped children in the district would no
longer have special education classes.
The Kiryas Joel district was created by the state to
encompass a community composed almost entirely of
Orthodox Jews who are members of the Satmar
Hasidic community. The community provides
religious-based schooling for those students who are
not handicapped.
The New York court said the law creating the
special school district violated part of the " Lemon
test" by creating a "symbolic union" between
church and state. " Lemon' ' is the name of the
petitioner in the landmark Supreme Court decision.
But the school district and the New York attorney
general's office applied to the Supreme Court for
help.
Last Wednesday, Justice Clarence Thomas without
comment stayed the state court order until either he
or the full court could form a response to the
application.
The response came in Monday's action.
It will probably be this fall or winter before the
Supreme Court decides whether it wants to hear the
appeal.
The high court is recessed for the summer until
the first Monday in October.
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